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Privacy has long been a matter of particular concern in the
minds of Americans. Indeed, privacy concerns were at the crux of the
American Revolution. The earliest days of colonial life saw creation of
laws protecting the individual against eavesdropping, and the sanctity
of one's home.1 The Bill of Rights also reflects privacy interests. 2 As
America grew, technological advances in the dissemination of
information caused public demands for protection of privacy rights;

I
Each year, the Vanderbilt Law Review publishes one issue with notes devoted solely to a
topic of current interest. These notes collectively constitute the Special Project. Past Special
Projects have delved into a wide array of topics, from bankruptcy, 59 VAND. L. REV. 159 (2006), to
criminal constitutional law in state courts, 47 VAND. L. REV. 795 (1994), to the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 52 VAND. L. REV. 763 (1999).
1.
Daniel J. Solove, The Origins and Growth of Information Privacy Law, 748 PLU/PAT 29,
33-34 (2003).
2.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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contemporary debates echo these demands. 3 For example, as early as
the Civil War, telegraph-tapping technologies emerged. Soon
afterward, Congress sought to obtain certain messages directly from
Western Union. This resulted in debate in both public fora and the
halls of Congress over the sanctity of personal communications. 4 A
familiar pattern has emerged over decades. Although there have been
slight variations in the privacy debate, the fundamental tension has
always been among the needs of the government, the desire of the
public to consume information through mass media, and the right of
an individual to her private world.
In today's rapidly advancing technological age, it seems as
though privacy has increasingly fallen by the wayside. From private
personal information stolen by hackers, to information lost through
careless transfer online (and sometimes even openly disclosed by
private entities or the government), today's newspapers are full of
stories about the loss of personal privacy in the Information Age. 5 The
ubiquity of information today has certainly brought the privacy of
individuals into the forefront of the national consciousness. Today,
6
there exist hundreds of different laws pertaining to privacy.
Against this background, policymakers, academics, and the
public continue to examine these centuries-old questions regarding
whether Americans have a constitutional right to privacy. If so, where
in the Constitution is the specific source of that right? If not, to what
extent should privacy be protected by statute or common law? These
questions remain unanswered to any satisfactory degree. Looking
back, however, it seems that the Framers intended some form of
constitutional protection of privacy. How much protection they
intended and whether their goal has been accomplished remain
elusive. 7 As a result, definitions and sources of a right to privacy

3.
Solove, supra note 1, at 36-40 (describing the census, the mail and the telegraph as
early developments that threatened privacy rights).
4.
Id. at 31-32.
5.
Judges Grill Lawyers in FEMA Aid Privacy Cases, NEWS-PRESS, Nov. 7, 2006,
http://www.news-press.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID/20061 107/NEWS01/61 107043/1075
(asking whether it is an invasion of privacy for FEMA to release the names and addresses of
individuals affected by Hurricane Katrina); Loss of Data at 19 FederalAgencies Raises Privacy
Concerns, KAN. CITY STAR, Oct. 14, 2006, http://www.kansascity.com/mld/kansascitystar/news/
politics/15756604.htm (reporting 788 incidents where federal employees had their personal
information either lost or stolen from government computers); Social Security Numbers Posted
Online, WSBTV, Oct. 31, 2006, http://www.wsbtv.com/news/10193623/detail.html?subid=
22105243&qs=l;bp=t (revealing that a county website posting federal tax documents for the
public left individual names and social security numbers on the documents).
6.
Solove, supra note 1, at 29.
Stanley H. Friedelbaum, The Quest for Privacy: State Courts and an Elusive Right, 65
7.
ALB. L. REV. 945, 945-47 (2002).
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continue to vary widely among scholars, the judiciary, and the public
in general.8
Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren were the first scholars to
describe privacy as a systemic legal right.9 Their seminal article
grounded a right to privacy in the Constitution. 10 As this article
gained recognition, privacy rights became accepted as part of
American constitutional law. At its most basic, this right was simply
conceived as "the right to be left alone;" from that concept two primary
branches of privacy rights developed, physical privacy and decisional
privacy."
The idea of a right to "informational privacy" has more recently
emerged as a branch of the right to privacy 12 Constitutional doctrine
and the common law have been slow to respond to claimed invasions of
informational privacy-when private information that one gives out to
third parties such as a health care provider, a bank, or the
government is stolen, misused, or wrongfully disclosed.' 3 The rapid
advancements of the technological age, which add to the already
unfilled holes in privacy rights law, have only resulted in more
questions for the courts to answer.
This Special Topic issue of the Vanderbilt Law Review explores
the right to privacy from several angles. The first Note examines the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act's ("HIPAA's")
Privacy Rule, an attempt by Congress to restrict sharing of an
individual's private medical records to the minimum disclosure
necessary for the functioning of the health care system. HIPAA's
intent to address current privacy concerns is laudable, but the author
points out that the unavailability of a private right of action presents
a classic enforcement problem. The victim of a HIPAA violation must
content herself with reporting the incident to the Department of
Health and Human Services. The Note explores other potential
sources of private rights of action under HIPAA, including Section
1983, the False Claims Act, and common law tort. It concludes that
the traditional confidentiality tort cause of action should be
reinterpreted for use in the HIPAA context and suggests a framework
for such reinterpretation.
8.
Id.
9.
Will Thomas DeVries, ProtectingPrivacy in the Digital Age, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
283, 286 (2003).
10. Id. at 284, 286.
11. Id. at 286. The physical privacy branch protects a person's physical self and effects,
while the decisional privacy branch looks to protecting a person's decisions such as the decision
to marry and have a family. Id.
12. Id. at 288.
13. Id. at 288-89.
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The second Note delves into the tension between the First
Amendment and information privacy rights. The author contends that
the Court has failed to articulate clearly the nature of the
constitutional conflict between privacy and speech, and that this has
led it to create a confused doctrinal framework that is inconsistent
with the underlying purpose of the First Amendment. He argues that
the Court's existing content-basedlcontent-neutral analytical approach
is perfectly capable of dealing with cases that present a conflict
between these two competing interests and explains how this
framework should be applied.
The final Note examines the origins of a constitutional right to
privacy as it is currently understood-as a substantive due process
right-and argues instead that the right to privacy should be
grounded in the Fourth Amendment. After detailing the history of
both the Fourth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment's
substantive due process right to privacy, the Note examines the
intense debate that the current framework has caused. It then
explains why the Fourth Amendment is a preferable source of such a
right, offers an interpretive framework based on it, and concludes that
the Supreme Court should borrow from equal protection jurisprudence
to adopt a mid-level scrutiny of the Fourth Amendment right to
privacy.
Melody Rachael Barron
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